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Normative non-naturalism may be usefully characterized, following Stephanie Leary (forthcoming, §1), as 
a view, according to which 
 
(1) Normative properties and facts exist; at least some of them are sui generis: they are 
different in kind from scientific and supernatural properties and facts. 
(2) Countenancing sui generis normative properties and facts is incompatible with a 
purely scientific worldview. 
 
There are many ways to further elucidate these claims. As for claim (1), one could, for instance, say that 
normative properties and facts are irreducibly normative, and try to cash this out in terms of normative 
properties and facts having to do with reasons (e.g., Olson 2014). Claim (1) also involves rejection of the 
idea that normative properties and facts are ‘nothing over and above’ natural or scientific properties and 
facts. According to non-naturalism, being morally wrong, for example, is not identical, and doesn’t wholly 
consist in having some natural property. We may contrast this thought with the thoughts that the 
property of being water just is the property of being made of H2O, and that being a parent may fully 
consist in having a daughter (see Enoch 2011, ch. 5.1; Parfit 2011, §87). As for claim (2), one could, for 
example, take it as the claim that “countenancing normative properties requires a further ontological or 
ideological commitment beyond that of our best scientific theories” (Leary, §1, n. 13).1 
 Non-naturalism faces a difficult challenge with regard to explaining why it is that the normative 
features of things supervene on their natural features. My focus will be on Leary’s recent response to this 
challenge, which appeals to hybrid properties, the essences of which link them to both natural and sui generis 
normative properties in suitable ways. I argue that despite its ingenuity, Leary’s solution fails. This is so, I 
claim, because there are no hybrid properties of the sort that her suggestion appeals to. 
 
 
                                                          
* I thank Stephanie Leary, the audiences at Stockholm and Uppsala (especially my commentators Olle Risberg and 
Daniel Fogal, as well as Jonas Olson, Anandi Hattiangadi, Krister Bykvist, and Matti Eklund), the Helsinki 
metaethics reading group, and a bunch of Helsinki colleagues for helpful feedback. The funding for this work was 
provided by the Academy of Finland. 
1 In what follows, the source for all the quotations from Leary, as well as for the paraphrases of her views, is Leary 
forthcoming. 
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1 – THE SUPERVENIENCE CHALLENGE AND ESSENTIALLY GROUNDED NON-NATURALISM 
I will assume that the normative strongly supervenes on the natural in that whenever something has a 
normative property, it also has some natural property such that it is metaphysically necessary that 
anything that has this natural property also has the normative property.2 Why is it that certain natural 
features metaphysically necessitate certain normative features? These necessities are not just brute, it 
seems. They require explanation. On some views, they are easily explained. If normative properties were 
natural properties, then the necessitation of the normative by the natural would be no mystery. However, 
according to the non-naturalist, normative properties are radically discontinuous in relation to the natural. 
The question then is: why are there necessary connections between the natural properties and the sui 
generis normative properties? Non-naturalism doesn’t seem to allow for any explanation for this, but rather 
seems to treat these necessary connections as brute. If that is correct, then this is plausibly a (big) minus 
for the view.3 
 Perhaps this is not quite the right way to push the challenge. Perhaps non-naturalists can explain 
the relevant necessities by appealing to the idea that certain natural properties have (perhaps given a 
suitable naturalistically specifiable context) the property of making things good, right, etc. (see Olson 
2014). But the critics may insist that this is a bad, metaphysically queer, explanation. How can this kind of 
making- or grounding-relation hold between radically discontinuous properties? 
 Leary’s response appeals to an essentialist metaphysics, according to which metaphysically 
necessary relations between properties are to be explained with reference to the essences of the relevant 
properties (e.g., Fine 1994, Rosen MS). The view she advances, essentially grounded non-naturalism, says that 
SUPERVENIENCE is true because the sui generis normative facts are fully grounded in natural facts – that is, 
roughly: obtain just in virtue of certain natural facts obtaining –, and the relevant grounding relations can 
be explained in terms of the essences of the properties involved. 
 Referring approvingly to Kit Fine (1994), Leary (§4) writes that for him, 
 
[…] the essence of an object or property [is] the set of propositions that are directly 
definitive of that object or property, which thereby describe the very nature of that 
object or property. For example, it’s directly definitive of being a bachelor that, if x is a 
bachelor, then x is unmarried. So, the proposition if x is a bachelor, then x is unmarried is 
part of the essence of being a bachelor. […] We may thus say that the essence of F involves 
G just in case G is a constituent of some proposition that is directly definitive of F. For 
example, the essence of being a bachelor involves being unmarried […]. 
                                                          
2 For some concerns, see Sturgeon 2009, Roberts MS, and Rosen MS. For some responses, see, e.g., Ridge 2007, 
McPherson 2012, and Dreier MS. 
3 This problem, or something in its neighborhood, has been advanced by a number of philosophers (see, e.g., Dreier 
1992, MS; McPherson 2012). For non-naturalist responses, see, e.g., Shafer-Landau 2003, Enoch 2011, Scanlon 
2014, Rosen MS. For criticisms of these responses, see, e.g., Dreier 2015, MS; Leary forthcoming. 
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And here’s Gideon Rosen (MS): 
 
It lies in the nature of the number 2, let’s suppose, to be a number, to follow 1, and so 
on. […] By contrast, even though it is a necessary truth that the number 2 is not the 
moon, it does not lie in the nature of the number 2, considered by itself, to be distinct 
from the moon. Intuitively, one might know everything there is to know about the 
identity of this number – about what makes 2 the number that it is – without knowing 
the first thing about astronomy. 
 
Appealing to the ‘ideology of essence’, we may plausibly explain why, for example, closed three-sided 
figures necessarily are triangles (it is just in the nature of a triangle to be a closed three-sided figure), or 
why any stuff that is water is made of H2O (that’s just what it is to be water). However, at first sight, the 
essentialist framework seems hostile to a non-naturalist explanation of normative supervenience. Let us 
suppose – with the hedonistic utilitarian – that, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, maximizing 
happiness is morally right. Now, what in the essences of the properties involved is supposed to explain 
this necessity? It seems quite clear that even if maximizing happiness necessarily is morally right, it is not 
part of the very essence of maximizing happiness that it is morally right. It is possible to have full 
knowledge of happiness maximization itself, it seems, without knowing the first thing about (what we are 
assuming to be) the correct moral theory. But the essence of moral rightness does not seem to offer the 
non-naturalist any help either. Given that moral rightness is sui generis, it seems that even if it is necessarily 
true that an action is morally right if and only if it maximizes happiness, this does not follow from the 
very nature of rightness (see Rosen MS for a much more detailed argument). Leary (§4) agrees: 
 
Within the essentialist framework, non-naturalism can be specified as the following view: 
Essentialist Non-naturalism: the essences of some normative properties 
(i) cannot be specified entirely in non-normative terms, and 
(ii) do not specify any non-normative sufficient conditions for their 
instantiation. 
[…] even a non-naturalist may presumably admit that, for example, it’s part of the 
essence of being right that, if x is right, then x is an action. […] a non-naturalist may [also] 
presumably admit that it’s essential of being right, for example, that if x produces the most 
good, then x is right. But according to Essentialist Non-naturalism, there are some 
normative properties that have essences that cannot be fully specified in non-normative 
terms and do not specify any non-normative sufficient conditions for their instantiation. 
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Leary’s thought is that non-naturalists should appeal to hybrid properties, whose essences “specify both 
naturalistic sufficient conditions for their own instantiation and sufficient conditions for the sui generis 
normative properties” (§4). She offers three examples of how this might work. 
 First, the non-naturalist could appeal to mental properties. She could claim, for instance, that “it’s 
part of the essence of being in pain that (a) if one’s C-fibers are firing, then one is in pain, and (b) that if x 
is a painful experience, x is bad” (§4). Given that the essence of being in a C-fibers-firing-state does not 
involve being in pain, being in a C-fibers-firing-state is a natural property. Yet (a) explains why C-fiber-
firing facts ground pain-facts. Given that the essence of pain involves badness, pain-facts are normative, 
but they are not sui generis (because the essence of pain specifies naturalistic sufficient conditions for being 
in pain). And (b) explains why pain-facts ground badness facts. Thus, on this account, badness-facts are 
ultimately grounded in wholly natural C-fiber-firing facts, and we get an explanation for supervenience.4 
 Second, Leary suggests, the non-naturalist could appeal to ‘thick’ normative properties such as 
being courageous, being a promise, or being a friend: “For example, one might claim that it’s part of the 
essence of being a promise that if certain natural conditions C obtain, then A promised B to do x, and that 
it’s also part of the essence of being a promise that if A promised B to do x, then A has a reason to do x” 
(§4). The explanation for supervenience would work just as with the example of pain. 
 Third, the defender of essentially grounded non-naturalism “might take being a reason to be the 
single hybrid normative property” and say “that the essence of being a reason specifies all the naturalistic 
sufficient conditions for R’s being a reason for someone to do A and sufficient conditions for the sui 
generis normative properties” (§4). Again, the explanation for supervenience would work through the 
hybrid property of being a reason, just as before. 
This seems really neat. It seems crucial, though, in order for the explanation of supervenience to 
go through, that the essence of the hybrid property captures not just naturalistic sufficient conditions, but 
– as Leary puts it in her characterization of the last of the examples above – all the naturalistic sufficient 
conditions for its instantiation. It is not sufficient that the essence of the hybrid property specifies some 
sufficient naturalistic conditions, C, for its instantiation. For suppose that there are also other naturalistic 
sufficient conditions, C*, for the instantiation of the hybrid property, that are not captured by its essence. 
Two naturalistically speaking identical things, both in conditions C*, but neither in conditions C, say, 
would then both have the hybrid property. But this would not be explained by the essence of this 
property. 
                                                          
4 Actually, it is not entirely clear how exactly this is supposed to work. The mere fact that it is part of the essence of 
some property, G, that if something has the property G, it also has a certain other property, F, does not explain why 
G-facts ground F-facts. For example, it is plausibly part of the essence of being a bachelor, that if someone is a 
bachelor, then he is also unmarried. But this doesn’t explain why facts about bachelorhood would ground facts 
about being unmarried, as facts about bachelorhood do not ground facts about being unmarried. However, I set this 
issue to one side here. 
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So, the crucial idea here would be that there are hybrid properties such that their essences specify 
all sufficient conditions for their instantiation in naturalistic terms. Moreover, it is also crucial that the 
essences of the hybrid properties together jointly specify all the possible grounds for the instantiation of all 
the sui generis normative properties. If something could be bad (say), but not in virtue of having some 
hybrid property, then there would be no guarantee, thanks to the essences of the hybrid properties, that 
two individuals that are identical with respect to their hybrid properties would also be identical with 
respect to their badness. It is worth emphasizing that this means that responding to the supervenience 
challenge by appeal to hybrid properties involves extremely strong commitments with regard to how to 
understand the structure of normativity. The strategy only has a chance of working if the hybrid has an 
explanatory priority over the sui generis. (This is a point I will return to later.) 
 
2 – THERE ARE NO HYBRID PROPERTIES 
Some experiences are painful, some acts constitute making a promise, and many features of things 
provide us with a wide array of reasons to act, feel, and believe in various ways. But the relevant 
properties are not, I suspect, hybrid in the sense suggested by Leary. My case against hybrid properties is 
in two parts. In this section, I shall examine some of Leary’s candidates for hybrid properties, suggesting 
that, intuitively, the essences of the relevant properties either fail to secure a link to sui generis normative 
properties, or, if they manage to do that, fail to determine naturalistic sufficient conditions for their 
instantiation. I then propose, in the next section, an explanation for why this should be so. 
 The non-naturalist could claim, again, that “it’s part of the essence of being in pain that (a) if 
one’s C-fibers are firing, then one is in pain, and (b) that if x is a painful experience, x is bad” (Leary, §4). 
On reflection, this seems problematic. It is useful to note, first, that one might sensibly deny, not only 
that pain is essentially bad, but also that pain would even necessarily be a bad thing. By ‘pain’ we may 
mean a certain kind of sensation, or the state of disliking a sensation of the relevant kind. Pain in the 
former sense is not necessarily bad. But some believe that when someone who has done something 
sufficiently terrible is in pain in the latter sense, there is nothing bad about this either. Rather, these 
people think, the world is made better by such painful experiences. Call these people ‘retributivists’. Of 
course pain is, also in these cases, bad for those who experience it. That is exactly why, retributivists think, 
their being in pain is good. However, I am assuming that the non-naturalist is, in the present context, 
interested in forging a link to ‘absolute’ badness – not to badness for someone or something, but to 
badness, period. 
 Let us next suppose that retributivists are wrong, and that being in pain really is necessarily bad. 
It is still implausible to claim that the retributivists would be missing something about the nature of pain. 
They full well realize what pain is like. They know what it is like to dislike, in the relevant sense, a 
sensation of the relevant kind. Isn’t that all there is to know about the nature of pain? Maybe not. Maybe 
we may find out more about the essence of pain by finding out about what grounds being in pain. Maybe 
to have a painful experience is to be in a brain state, whatever it is, that plays the ‘pain-role’. So, let us 
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suppose that the retributivists know their neuroscience, too. They know that pain is always realized in C-
fibers firing (suppose that this is so). Are they still missing out on something when it comes to knowing 
the essence of pain? It doesn’t seem so. But the retributivists do not know that pain is bad, period, even 
though it necessarily is. It seems, then, that it is not part of the essence of the property of being in pain, 
that if someone is in pain, this is bad. The property of being in pain does not seem to be hybrid in Leary’s 
sense. (Not everyone will share my intuitions here, but this is okay.) 
 Let us next consider the property of being a reason. This is perhaps a somewhat surprising 
candidate for being hybrid. The property of being a reason is standardly counted among the 
paradigmatically ‘thin’ normative properties. Non-naturalists also often take it to be sui generis. Even 
though it is very plausible that it is part of the essence of being a reason that if there is reason to take a 
favorable attitude toward x, then x is good, or that if there is most reason to perform a certain action, 
then this action ought to be performed, it does not seem plausible that the essence of being a reason for 
action, say, would specify “all the naturalistic sufficient conditions” for something’s being a reason for 
acting. One can fully know what it is to be a reason for action, it seems, without having any idea of the 
conditions that actually make it the case that some action has the property of being supported by reasons. 
To be a reason for performing some action is to count in favor of performing this action. Suppose that it 
is necessary that only the fact that an action promotes happiness counts in favor of performing the action 
in question. Still, in order to capture the essence of being a reason for action one is not required to 
mention the facts about being promotive of happiness. 
 It is of course not obvious that the essence of the property of being a reason does not specify 
sufficient naturalistic conditions for being a reason. Many philosophers think it does. For example, Mark 
Schroeder (2007) argues that for some consideration to be a reason for an agent to perform some action 
just is for the truth of this consideration to help to explain why performing the action promotes the 
satisfaction of the agent’s goals. But Schroeder’s view is a prime example of a naturalistic account of 
normative properties. If we can specify sufficient naturalistic conditions for reasonhood by appeal to its 
essence, it is not clear why we could not do this with the essences of the rest of the normative properties, 
too. It is hard to see what independent motivation there would be for a picture on which reasonhood is 
not sui generis, but some other normative properties are. 
 How about the properties picked out by ‘thick’ concepts? One of the examples used by Leary is 
the property of being a promise. The thought would be, again,  that “it’s part of the essence of being a 
promise that if certain natural conditions C obtain, then A promised B to do x, and that it’s also part of the 
essence of being a promise that if A promised B to do x, then A has a reason to do x”  (§4). It is plausible 
enough (although of course not obviously true) that the fact that one has promised to do something 
always gives some reason for one to perform this action. But even if this is correct, this does not seem to 
lie in the very nature of being a promise. 
 Derek Parfit (2011, Ch. 25), in his discussion of the attempts to challenge there being a “deep 
distinction” between the natural and the normative, argues that the fact that one has promised to do 
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something does not entail that one ought to act accordingly. What he says should apply equally well to the 
idea that the fact that someone has promised to do something would entail that she would have some 
reason to act accordingly. Let us begin with a conceptual point. An act consequentialist, for example, 
might very well believe that the mere fact that someone has promised to perform a certain action does 
not, in itself, give her any reason to act accordingly. Whether one has reason to keep the promise will, by 
the act consequentialist’s lights, depend on whether the relevant action would promote the good. 
Plausibly, act consequentialism cannot be refuted by appealing to what follows from the concept of a 
promise. And so, if Parfit is right, there is at least no conceptual entailment from having made a promise to 
it being the case that one ought to act accordingly. 
Parfit’s conclusions would seem to be applicable also to what lies in the nature, or essence, of the 
property of being a promise. Plausibly, the act utilitarian, while perhaps making a normative mistake, need 
not have an incomplete grasp of the nature of a promise. The act utilitarian may have a full understanding 
of the kinds of circumstances and speech acts, the combinations of which result in promises having been 
made. She may full well understand that the practice of making promises is dependent on a widespread 
commitment to do what has been promised, and that certain expectations and sanctions must be in place 
in order for the practice of promising to continue to exist. Yet she may think that it is not necessarily true 
that there is reason to keep one’s promises. She may be making a normative mistake, but what she is 
perhaps missing does not plausibly lie in the nature of promise itself. 
 With many of the properties discussed in the thick concepts literature, it is not clear, at all, that 
they actually involve sui generis normative properties. Parfit (2011, §90), for instance, lists as examples of 
thick concepts the concepts expressed by the words ‘cruel’, ‘kind’, ‘rude’, ‘unpatriotic’, ‘chaste’, 
‘courageous’, and ‘dishonest’. In all these cases, it seems quite reasonable to hold that the properties 
picked out – the properties of being cruel, kind, etc. – can be reductively analyzed in entirely naturalistic 
terms. The relevant words certainly somehow carry evaluation, but perhaps merely as a matter of 
pragmatics (Väyrynen 2013). 
 Other properties discussed in the thick concepts literature seem different. To take another 
example from Parfit, let us consider the property of being retributively unjust. It seems plausible that it is 
part of the essence of being retributively unjust that if a punishment is retributively unjust, then it is 
wrong. However, while this is plausible, it is not plausibly part of the essence of being retributively unjust 
that there is a certain (perhaps disjunctive) set of natural properties such that if a punishment has these 
properties, it is retributively unjust. We may again begin with a conceptual point. Suppose someone 
argued from (A) to (B) to (C) (Parfit 2011, §90): 
 
(A) Blue has not committed any crime. 
(B) Blue’s punishment would be retributively unjust. 
(C) Blue’s punishment would be wrong. 
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Whereas we may coherently deny that chastity is good, or, perhaps, that cruelty is bad, it is less plausible 
that we could coherently deny that retributively unjust punishment is wrong, and so reject the move from 
(B) to (C). However, as Parfit points out, it is possible to coherently reject the move from (A) to (B). We 
might think that no punishment is retributively unjust, for example, because we might think (say) that no 
one has the kind of free will that would be required in order for a punishment to be retributively just or 
unjust. Now, let us suppose that this is indeed what we think, but that we have got things wrong. That is, 
let’s suppose that it is true that if Blue has not committed any crime, then his punishment would be 
retributively unjust. One possibility would be that, despite the coherence of our view, we would be 
missing something that lies in the nature of retributive injustice. But this seems implausible. It seems as if 
we, who reject the move from (A) to (B), may know the nature of retributive injustice just as well as 
someone who (rightly, we are now imagining) is willing to make this move. We are aware of the links that 
hold between being retributively unjust and being wrong. We may also know that if a punishment were 
retributively unjust, then it would have to have certain kind of naturalistic properties, or even certain 
specific naturalistic properties, which would suffice for its being retributively unjust. And this might all be 
part of the essence of being retributively unjust. So, unlike with painfulness and the property of being a 
promise, the essence of being retributively unjust would involve sui generis normative properties in that if a 
punishment is retributively unjust, it is wrong. And unlike with the property of being a reason, the essence 
of being retributively unjust might involve certain naturalistic properties, in that if a punishment were 
retributively unjust, it would have certain naturalistic properties, N. But it still would not seem to lie in the 
nature of retributive injustice that if something has N, it is also retributively unjust. 
We may also consider the following example. Someone might sensibly claim that it is part of the 
essence of being lewd, that if something is lewd, it involves overt display of sexuality, and also, that if 
something is lewd, it is bad. But it does not lie in the nature of being lewd that if something involves 
overt display of sexuality, it is lewd, and that if something is lewd, it is bad. We can know the essence of 
lewdness – what it is to be lewd – without thereby accepting the highly questionable view that anything 
that involves overt display of sexuality is on that account bad. 
Someone might worry that I am perhaps making the following two assumptions: (i) If someone 
fully competent with concepts A (of property F) and B (of property N) may reject claims of the form ‘If x 
is B, then it is also A,’ then it cannot be part of the essence of being F that if something is N, it is F. And 
(ii) if someone fully competent with concepts A (of property F) and C (of property G) may reject claims 
of the form ‘If x is A, then it is also C,’ then it cannot be part of the essence of being F that if something 
is F, it is G. Making these assumptions would be a mistake. For example, someone fully competent with 
‘water’, but lacking in empirical knowledge, could very well reject the claim that water is H2O. We should 
not infer from this that it is not part of the essence of being water that if some stuff is water, it is made of 
H2O. However, I am not making the relevant mistaken assumptions. The case of water is quite different 
from the case of hybrid properties. In the case of water, we have an explanation for why someone with 
complete mastery of the term ‘water’ may yet be less than fully acquainted with the essence of water. 
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Plausibly, anyone competent with ‘water’ is in a position to realize, if she considers the relevant idea, that water 
is stuff of some kind, or stuff that plays a certain kind of ‘watery role’. And of course one may, then, be 
completely in the dark when it comes to the identity of the relevant stuff. However, it is very unclear how 
a similar story would work in the case of hybrid properties. One cannot, for instance, simply appeal to the 
idea that the concept of being retributively unjust tells us that things are retributively unjust thanks to 
some naturalistic property, and that further substantial a priori reflection may then inform us about the 
identity of the relevant naturalistic properties. This may be true, but this does not give us any reason to 
think that it is part of the essence of being retributively unjust that if something has the relevant natural 
property, it is retributively unjust. The concept of water involves the idea that water just is whatever stuff 
plays a certain role. And so, being made of the relevant stuff lies in the very nature of being water. That 
things are retributively unjust in virtue of some naturalistic properties, by contrast, does not point us 
toward any potentially hidden essence of retributive injustice. It does not tell us that retributive injustice 
just is (or, say, just consists in having) some property, which we must then identify through means other 
than conceptual analysis. 
 I have now made my ‘intuitive case’ against the existence of hybrid properties. To the extent that 
these properties are considered as having essential links of the relevant kind to the natural (which 
admittedly often seems like an attractive idea), they are unlikely to have essential links to the sui generis 
normative; to the extent that these properties are considered as having essential links to the sui generis 
normative (which admittedly often seems like an attractive idea), they are unlikely to have essential links 
of the relevant kind to the natural. Before offering an attempt at a principled explanation for why this is 
so, I shall make just two more quick comments. 
First, I have only considered a small sample of candidate hybrid properties. However, even if we 
cannot rule out the possibility that there might be some properties that really are hybrid in the relevant 
sense, we should remember that in order for Leary’s strategy for saving non-naturalism to succeed, the 
hybrid properties would have to do some really impressive explanatory work. For any sui generis normative 
fact, we should be able to explain it as grounded in some suitable instantiation of hybrid properties. The 
less there are credible candidates for hybrid properties, the more unlikely it seems that this could be done. 
And so it seems that, given the considerations offered above, the prospects of saving non-naturalism 
through deploying Leary’s strategy are dim, even if some properties would seem like good candidates for 
being hybrid. 
 Second, the lessons from considering the small sample of examples seem to generalize. It is 
perhaps useful to very briefly consider the standard menu of options from the thick concepts literature 
(see, e.g., Roberts 2013). With the thick properties, we either can, or we cannot, ‘disentangle’ the natural 
from the normative. That is, we either can, or we cannot, understand every instantiation of a thick 
property in terms of naturalistic properties and sui generis normative properties. If this cannot be done, 
there’s no naturalistic ‘shape’ to the thick properties. But if there is no naturalistic shape to the thick, then 
the essences of the properties picked out by thick concepts won’t specify all the naturalistic sufficient 
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conditions for their instantiation. So, if we are to pursue Leary’s strategy in defense of non-naturalism, 
‘non-reductive’ views, according to which we cannot disentangle, would seem to be off the table. 
However, if we can disentangle, then it seems that we can always pursue the Parfit-style strategy of 
arguing that one may fully grasp the essence of the relevant hybrid property, and yet reject the idea that it 
would lie in the essence of this property that if something has certain naturalistic properties, it also has 
the property in question. Also, finally, if the thick or hybrid properties can be reductively analyzed in 
entirely naturalistic terms, then they clearly won’t be of any help for the non-naturalist in explaining 
normative supervenience. 
 
3 – WHY THERE ARE NO HYBRID PROPERTIES, AND WHY IT MIGHT EASILY SEEM OTHERWISE 
I have now raised doubts about the existence of hybrid properties. Is there something more principled 
that could be said on this score? Why are there no hybrid properties? Also, what explains the admittedly 
quite powerful temptation to think that such properties exist? In this section, I shall try to answer these 
questions, starting with an explanation for why it is no surprise that hybrid properties seem suspicious 
upon close examination. 
Leary gives a nice characterization, herself, of what I take to be the basic problem with hybrid 
properties: 
 
[…] one might think that non-naturalists cannot, in principle, offer an explanation for 
why there are necessary connections between natural and normative properties. This is 
because any explanation for why there are metaphysical necessities involving the natural 
and the normative must posit some fairly intimate metaphysical connection between the 
natural and the normative. But positing such a connection seems to be in tension with 
the non-naturalist’s claim that the normative is entirely distinct and deeply different in 
kind from the natural. 
 
Leary proposes that we bridge the gap between the natural and the normative by appealing to hybrid 
properties. However, this seems unlikely to succeed. For if we secure a necessary connection with the 
normative by understanding the hybrid properties as intimately connected to the normative ones, we lose 
intimacy in relation to the natural; and if we secure a necessary connection with the natural by 
understanding hybrid properties as intimately connected to the natural properties, the normative slips out 
of our reach. I will now try to explain this in somewhat less metaphorical terms. 
Leary’s proposal can be illustrated with the idea that the fact that an experience is painful might 
ground its being bad. While Leary grants that this grounding relation could not be explained by the 
essence of the grounded sui generis normative property of badness, it could perhaps be explained, she 
suggests, by the essence of the grounding property of being painful. The property of being painful is just 
an example, of course. Leary isn’t committed to painfulness being a hybrid property. But on her account, 
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all the explanations of the instantiations of the sui generis properties have the same structure. What is 
involved in the essence of a property is a matter of what it is to be the relevant way. The truths that obtain 
in virtue of the essence of a certain property are truths that “lie in the nature” of this property (e.g., Rosen 
MS, sec. 3). Here are some necessary truths that are plausibly explained in terms of the essences of the 
properties involved: 
 
WATER  If something is made of H2O, it is water. 
TRIANGLE  If something is a closed three-sided figure, it is a triangle. 
DAUGHTER If someone has a daughter, she or he is a parent. 
CAT   If something is a cat, it is a mammal. 
RED   If something is red, it is colored. 
 
One could also make the following, corresponding claims about grounding relations: 
 
WATER* If something is made of H2O, it is, in virtue of this, water. 
TRIANGLE* If something is a closed three-sided figure, it is, in virtue of this, a 
triangle. 
DAUGHTER* If someone has a daughter, she or he is, in virtue of this, a parent. 
CAT* If something is a cat, it is so in virtue of being a certain kind of 
mammal. 
RED*  If something is red, it is, in virtue of this, colored. 
 
The truth of RED* plausibly lies in the nature of the grounding property, redness: to be red just is to be 
colored in a certain way (in the red-sort-of-way). Likewise, the truth of CAT* seems to lie in the nature of 
catness. For some creature to be a cat just is for it to be a certain species of mammal. The truth of 
DAUGHTER* lies in the nature of the grounded property: to be a parent is to have a child, and since 
having a daughter is having a child, parenthood may fully consist in having a daughter. Some think that 
WATER* and TRIANGLE* are also true. I am not so certain. It seems that WATER and TRIANGLE are true 
because the relevant properties are identical, and it also seems that something cannot have a property in 
virtue of having this very property. Grounding is explanatory, I take it, and having a property does not 
explain itself. Still, at least WATER and TRIANGLE are true. It is perhaps most natural to think that their 
truth lies in the natures of the property of being water and of the property of being a triangle. But, then, if 
these are just the same properties as the properties of being made of H2O and of being a closed three-
sided figure, we should be able to pick out the relevant essences (in which the truth of the relevant claims 
lie) also in these terms – which does, indeed, seem possible. 
Leary’s case of being painful and being bad seems very different from all these cases. Unlike in 
the cases of WATER and TRIANGLE, there is no relation of identity between being painful and being bad. 
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The non-naturalist will also insist that being bad cannot consist in being painful, like being a parent may 
consist in having a daughter. Neither is being painful a way of being bad, like being red is a way of being 
colored – the idea that the relationship between these properties would be that of a determinable and a 
determinate is not compatible with the thought that being bad is sui generis, and something ‘over and 
above’ being painful (cf. Schroeder 2014). Also, being painful is not a species of the genus, badness, and so 
the cat-mammal relationship does not work as a good model for what would be needed. It is true, again, 
that grounding relations may be explained with reference to the essences of the properties involved. But 
explanations of this sort work because the relevant properties are intimately metaphysically linked – 
because having the grounded property is not something over and above having the grounding one. And 
so explanations of this kind do not seem to be available for a non-naturalist about normativity. 
 Some might worry that I am just rehearsing here a familiar Humean prejudice against necessary 
connections between very different, or fully distinct, properties. But this is not so. My claim is not that 
there could be no necessary connections between natural and sui generis normative properties. My claim is, 
much more guardedly, that the essences of the hybrid properties do not allow us to explain such 
connections. Essentialist explanations must work through intimate metaphysical relations. And we have 
no such relations obtaining in the present case, it seems. 
 Some might also think that my claims here can be counter-exampled. Let us consider the 
properties of being colored and being extended in space. It seems natural to think that these are “quite 
different kinds of properties,” as Leary (§1) puts it, and yet it is plausibly part of the essence of being 
colored that anything that is colored also occupies some volume in space.5 Leary (§1) suggests that the 
fact that the necessary relation between being colored and being extended in space has an obvious 
explanation: “in order for something to be colored, it must reflect or emit light, and in order for 
something to reflect or emit light, it must occupy some volume in space.” We may give this kind of 
explanation an essentialist twist. We could say, for example, that to be colored just is to have some 
property that grounds a disposition to look a certain way to normal observers. Plausibly, having a 
property of this kind just is a matter of having a suitable surface reflectance property. And having such 
reflectance property, in its turn, is nothing over and above having a molecule structure of an appropriate 
kind – that is, a matter of being extended in space in a certain way. It is not uncontroversial, of course, 
that this would be the right kind of account of color. But on this sort of view, for instance, it would turn 
out that although being colored and being extended in space seem to be quite different properties, having 
a certain color nevertheless is nothing over and above being extended in space in a certain way. An 
essentialist explanation for the necessity of colored things having spatial extension might, then, be within 
our reach. This is of course just one attempt at a counter-example to the idea that essentialist explanations 
for necessary links between properties are only available given that having one property is nothing over 
                                                          
5 Leary uses this as an example of a necessary relation between two seemingly quite different kinds of properties, 
which nevertheless is explainable. Krister Bykvist (in personal communication) has independently proposed this as a 
counter-example to my claims in this section. 
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and above having the other. But this idea seems quite irresistible, really. The relevant, essentialist, 
explanations for necessary links between properties are meant to flow from the essences of the properties 
at issue – simply from what it is to be this way or that. A genuine counter-example would need to involve 
two properties that are quite distinct, and yet necessarily linked by virtue of their very essences. It is 
difficult to think of this kind of example. 
It is also important to keep in mind that none of this is to suggest that a non-naturalist cannot 
hold that there are properties the essences of which involve both natural and sui generis normative 
properties. One could hold, for instance, that to be retributively unjust is, in part, to be wrong. Or, 
contrary to what I have suggested above, that to be in pain just is to be in a certain naturalistically 
describable state, and to be, on that account, in a bad state. It is not implausible that many properties 
picked out by thick concepts should be explained along these lines (Elstein & Hurka 2009). But this kind 
of proposal is of no help in the present context. According to Leary’s proposal, the ‘thin’ sui generis 
properties should be grounded in the hybrid ones, and this is incompatible with the thought that we can 
analyze the thick in terms of the natural and the thin. 
 This may also point toward at least one reason for why Leary’s proposal is quite alluring. What 
we need, on this proposal, is properties, the essences of which involve both the natural and the sui generis 
normative. Properties such as being retributively unjust are indeed like this, if they are to be explained 
reductively in terms of the natural and the thinly normative. On this picture, these properties are such that 
to have them is to have certain sui generis normative properties. And it is also very tempting to think that 
the essences of these properties specify naturalistic sufficient conditions for their instantiation. For if 
something is retributively unjust, for instance, then it will have natural properties of a certain sort. This 
much is guaranteed by the essence of being retributively unjust (according to the kind of proposal that we 
area now considering). It is easy to mistake this thought for the thought that it would be part of the 
essence of this property that if something has the relevant natural properties, it is also retributively unjust. 
 
4 – CONCLUSION 
I have argued that Leary’s explanation for the supervenience of the normative on the natural, given in 
terms of hybrid properties, does not work. Given that the critics of the other existing attempts at 
explaining supervenience in a non-naturalism-friendly way are correct, this might be taken to be very bad 
news for non-naturalism. But of course, for all I have said, some of the criticisms of the other attempts 
may be wrong. And – more importantly, to my mind – there may be ways of responding to the challenge 
that are yet to be articulated. 
 
REFERENCES 
Blackburn, S., 1998. Ruling Passions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Dreier, J., 1992. “The Supervenience Argument against Moral Realism,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 30: 13–38. 
Dreier, J., 2015. “Explaining the Quasi-Real,” in R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 10. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Essentially grounded on-naturalism and normative supervenience – 16 January 2017 
 14 
Dreier, J., MS. “Is There a Supervenience Problem for Robust Moral Realism?” 
Elstein, D. & Hurka, T., 2009. “From Thick to Think: Two Moral Reduction Plans,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39: 
515–535. 
Enoch, D., 2011. Taking Morality Seriously (New York: Oxford University Press). 
Fine, K., 1994. “Essence and Modality,” Philosophical Perspectives 8: 1–16. 
Leary, S., forthcoming. “Non-naturalism and Normative Necessities,” in R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in 
Metaethics, Vol. 12. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
McPherson, T., 2012. “Ethical Non-Naturalism and the Metaphysics of Supervenience,” in R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), 
Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 7. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Olson, J., 2014. Moral Error Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Parfit, D., 2011. On What Matters, Vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ridge, M., 2007. “Anti-Reductionism and Supervenience,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 4: 330–348. 
Ridge, M., 2014. Impassioned Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Roberts, D., 2013. “Thick Concepts,” Philosophy Compass 8: 677–688. 
Roberts, D., MS. “Why Believe in Normative Supervenience?” 
Rosen, G., MS. “What is Normative Necessity?” 
Scanlon, T. M., 2014. Being Realistic about Reasons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Schroeder, M., 2007. Slaves of the Passions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Schroeder, M., 2014. “The Price of Supervenience,” in Explaining the Reasons We Share: Explanation and Expression in 
Ethics, Volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Shafer-Landau, R., 2003. Moral Realism: A Defence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sturgeon, N., 2009. “Doubts about the Supervenience of the Evaluative,” in R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in 
Metaethics, Vol. 4. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Väyrynen, P., 2013. The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty: A Study of Thick Concepts in Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
